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This article examines the foreign discovery provisions in the Restatement
(Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States. First, the article ,
discusses those provisions in conjunction with the Supreme Court's decision in
the Arospatiale case. 1 Second, the article comments on the application by lower
courts of the principles contained in Airospatiale and the Restatement (Third's)
foreign discovery provisions. Third, the article addresses the proposed amend-
ments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP), which would, in effect,
overrule Airospatiale and would require a major revision to the relevant provi-
sions of the Restatement (Third). The resulting conclusion is that the ad hoc
balancing test set out in Airospatiale has not been implemented by lower courts
in the manner intended. The proposed changes to FRCP 26 and 28 provide firmer
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1. Socidt6 Nationale Industrielle Adrospatiale v. United States Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522
(1987) [hereinafter Adrospatiale].
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guidance to the lower courts and should result in a more balanced consideration
of the conflicting U.S. and foreign interests.
I. Present Law
A. DiscussION OF THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
The Restatement (Third) contains two sections that specifically address inter-
national discovery: section 442, "Requests for Disclosure: Law of the United
States '" 2 and section 473, "Obtaining Evidence in Foreign State.
' 3
2. Section 442 states:
Requests for Disclosure: Law of the United States
(1)(a) A court or agency in the United States, when authorized by statute or rule of court, may order a person
subject to its jurisdiction to produce documents, objects, or other information relevant to an action or
investigation, even if the information or the person in possession of the information is outside the United
States.
(b) Failure to comply with an order to produce information may subject the person to whom the order is
directed to sanctions, including finding of contempt, dismissal of a claim or defense, or default judgment,
or may lead to a determination that the facts to which the order was addressed are as asserted by the
opposing party.
(c) In deciding whether to issue an order directing production of information located abroad, and in framing
such an order, a court or agency in the United States should take into account the importance to the
investigation or litigation of the documents or other information requested; the degree of specificity of the
request; whether the information originated in the United States; the availability of alternative means of
securing the information; and the extent to which noncompliance with the request would undermine
important interests of the United States, or compliance with the request would undermine important
interests of the state where the information is located.
(2) If disclosure of information located outside the United States is prohibited by a law, regulation, or order of
a court or other authority of the state in which the information or prospective witness is located, or of the state
of which a prospective witness is a national,
(a) a court or agency in the United States may require the person to whom the order is directed to make a good
faith effort to secure permission from the foreign authorities to make the information available;
(b) a court or agency should not ordinarily impose sanctions of contempt, dismissal, or default on a party that
has failed to comply with the order for production, except in cases of deliberate concealment or removal
of information or of failure to make a good faith effort in accordance with paragraph (a);
(c) a court or agency may, in appropriate cases, make findings of fact adverse to a party that has failed to
comply with the order for production, even if that party has made a good faith effort to secure permission
from the foreign authorities to make the information available and that effort has been unsuccessful.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 442 (1987)
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)].
3. Section 473 states:
Obtaining Evidence in Foreign State
(I) Under international law, a state may determine the conditions for taking evidence in its territory in aid of
litigation in another state, but the state of the forum may determine its admissibility, probative value, and
effect.
(2) Under the Hague Evidence Convention,
(a) each contracting state is required to designate a Central Authority to which letters of request for assistance
in obtaining evidence for use in civil or commercial litigation may be addressed by courts of other
contracting states, and the Central Authority must direct that any letter of request meeting the requirements
of the Convention be executed expeditiously, in accordance with the procedures, including measures of
compulsion, for obtaining evidence for use in the requested state's courts;
(b) a contracting state may determine the conditions for taking evidence in its territory, without compulsion,
by diplomatic or consular officers, or by commissioners designated by a court in another contracting state,
for use in civil or commercial litigation pending in that state.
(3) A person required or requested to give evidence for use in a foreign state, whether pursuant to the Hague
Evidence Convention or through other arrangements for judicial assistance. may refuse to do so insofar as he
has a privilege or a duty of nondisclosure under either the law of the state of origin of the request or of the
state in which the evidence is sought.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 2, § 473.
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Section 442 deals with efforts to secure information under direct order of a
U.S. court or comparable authority. 4 It begins with the premise that U.S. courts
and agencies retain full authority over persons under their jurisdiction in discov-
ery matters regardless of the foreign situs of the information sought.5 A court or
agency may impose sanctions for failure to comply with an order to produce
information. 6 This authority to compel production should be tempered by a
balancing of the competing national interests and the litigation realities of the
case at hand. 7 Previously, in order to resolve international discovery conflicts,
courts referred to the balancing test found in section 40 of the original Restate-
ment of Foreign Relations Law, a section dealing with conflicts of enforcement
jurisdiction. 8
The remainder of section 442 addresses instances in which a foreign statute
prohibits discovery of the information at issue. In such cases, U.S. courts and
agencies can order the party against whom discovery is sought to make a good
faith effort to obtain permission from the foreign government to make the in-
formation available. 9 However, U.S. courts and agencies usually should refrain
from the issuance of sanctions such as contempt, dismissal, or default in those
cases in which a foreign statute prevents discovery, unless the party has failed to
make the required good faith effort or has deliberately concealed or removed
evidence.'o Courts and agencies remain free to make findings of fact adverse to
a party who, despite making a good faith effort, is still unable or unwilling to
produce the information. 1
Section 473 sets out the procedural and evidentiary guidelines for gathering
evidence in a foreign state using international judicial assistance. The state in
which the evidence is gathered may set conditions for this process, but it is the
forum state that determines the admissibility, probative value, and effect of the
evidence.' 2 The second paragraph of section 473 repeats the procedures and
4. Id. § 442 comment a.
5. Id. § 442(1)(a).
6. Id. § 442(1)(b).
7. Id. § 442(1)(c).
8. Section 40 requires two states that both may have jurisdiction over a person and that may
require inconsistent conduct of a person to consider moderating their enforcement jurisdiction over
that person in light of such factors as the person's nationality and the national interests at stake.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 40 (1965). Section
403 of the Restatement (Third) contains comparable provisions. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra
note 2, § 403.
9. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 2, § 442(2)(a).
10. Id. § 442(2)(b).
11. Id. § 442(2)(c).
12. Id. § 473(1).
SUMMER 1991
334 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
obligations of contracting states under the Hague Evidence Convention (HEC). 13
The final paragraph of section 473 notes that a person may refuse to give evi-
dence, for use in a foreign state, that is privileged in either the state of the origin
of the request or the state in which the evidence is sought. 14
Sections 442 and 473 of the Restatement (Third) are related to principles
set out in two Supreme Court cases: Socidtj Nationale Industrielle Airospa-
tiale v. United States District Court15 and SocitJ Internationale pour Partici-
pations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers (Interhandel).16 Aeros-
patiale in particular has been important and therefore is examined in detail.
This analysis begins with a short summary of that case and then focuses on




In Mrospatiale individuals allegedly injured in an airplane crash in Iowa sued
two French aircraft manufacturing and marketing corporations under negligence
and breach of warranty theories.' 8 The plaintiffs sought the production of doc-
uments located in France and the answering of interrogatories by the French
defendant corporations pursuant to the discovery procedures in the FRCP. 19 The
French defendants moved for a protective order from the court on two grounds.
First, they contended that discovery in France could be conducted only pursuant
to the procedures set forth in the HEC, and therefore plaintiffs should be required
to pursue their discovery by that method.2 ° Second, they argued that the French
"blocking" statute forbade them from responding to discovery requests that did
not comply with the HEC. 2'
The Supreme Court rejected both of the defendants' contentions. As to
the defendants' first contention, a unanimous Court held that the HEC is not the
13. Id. § 473(2); see Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial
Matters, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444, 847 U.N.T.S.
231, reprinted at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1781 (West Supp. 1990) [hereinafter HEC].
14. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 2, § 473(3).
15. 482 U.S. 522 (1987).
16. 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
17. This discussion of Adrospatiale is based in large part on an article previously published by
one of the co-authors. Griffin, Procedures for Civil Discovery Outside the United States after Agro-
spatiale, 15 INT'L Bus. LAW. 350 (1987).
18. Airospatiale, 482 U.S. at 524-25.
19. Id. at 525-26.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 526.
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exclusive means for discovery involving countries that are signatories to the
HEC.22 The Court then split sharply on the proper role of the HEC. A
five-Justice majority refused to endorse a rule of first resort to the HEC.23
Instead, the majority created an ad hoc balancing test calling for a weighing
"of the particular facts, sovereign interests, and likelihood that resort to-
. . . [HEC] procedures will prove effective." 24 The majority stressed concerns
about the "time consuming and expensive" procedures that may be necessary
under the HEC.25
The four-Justice minority advocated a general presumption of first resort to the
HEC.26 Arguing that most U.S. judges have little experience in transnational
litigation and little competence in determining what particular acts offend foreign
nations, the minority contended that "pro-forum bias" would creep into the
majority's balancing test resulting in infrequent use of the HEC. 27 In turn, this
would subvert the policies established by the President and the Senate in nego-
tiating and ratifying the HEC.
2 8
The bulk of the minority's criticism, however, was reserved for the majori-
ty's comity analysis. The minority took issue with the use of FRCP discovery
measures in foreign states, especially civil law states that have consented to
the HEC.29 Use of discovery methods other than the HEC in signatory
countries, the minority argued, impinges upon the sovereignty of foreign
states. 30 The minority proposed a test of its own. It would require consider-
ation of U.S. interests, foreign interests, and the international interest "in a
smoothly functioning international legal regime" in determining if the HEC
should be applied. 3 1
The defendants' second argument, that the French blocking statute prohibits
discovery except in accordance with the HEC, was also rejected. 32 Citing In-
terhandel,3 3 the majority stated that blocking statutes do not deprive a U.S. court
of the power to order a party subject to its jurisdiction to produce evidence, even
22. Id. at 539-40, 548.
23. Id. at 542.
24. Id. at 544 (footnote omitted).
25. Id. at 542.
26. Id. at 548-49.
27. Id. at 553.
28. Id. at 551 -52.
29. Id. at 554-61.
30. Id. at 556-57.
31. Id. at 555 (footnote omitted).
32. Id. at 544 n.29.
33. Interhandel, 357 U.S. 197, 204-06 (1958).
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though the act of production may violate a blocking statute. 34 The majority
acknowledged that the existence of such a statute is relevant to the trial court's
comity analysis, but only to the degree that the statute can be linked with a
foreign sovereign's interest in the nondisclosure of specific information.
35
II. Survey of Lower Court Implementation of Adrospatiale
36
In performing the supposedly neutral balancing test advocated by the Airos-
patiale majority, lower courts have shown the pro-forum bias toward FRCP
discovery rules and U.S. interests predicted by the Airospatiale minority. Lower
courts have consistently placed the burden of proving the HEC's effectiveness on
the party advocating use of the HEC. This has proven a difficult and impractical
burden to sustain. In addition, lower courts have accorded little or no weight to
international comity concerns in resolving disputes about foreign discovery.37
Thus lower courts have applied the majority's balancing test in a manner that
rarely results in use of the HEC.
A. PLACING THE BURDEN ON THE PARTY
MOVING FOR USE OF THE HEC
DISCOURAGES USE OF THE CONVENTION
The majority opinion in Airospatiale is not clear as to whether the proponent
of the HEC or the proponent of the FRCP should bear the burden of proving that
its method should be used for foreign discovery.38 Most lower courts, relying on
the Supreme Court's statement that a foreign litigant should have "a full and fair
opportunity to demonstrate appropriate reasons for employing Convention pro-
cedures," 39 have found that the proponent of the HEC (the HEC movant) has the
burden of proving that its use is appropriate.4°
34. Adrospatiale, 482 U.S. at 544 n.29.
35. Id.
36. For a further discussion of the application by lower courts of the principles contained in
Adrospatiale, see Born, Comity and the Lower Courts: Post-Adrospatiale Application of the Hague
Evidence Convention, 24 INT'L LAW. 393 (1990).
37. See, e.g., Benton Graphics v. Uddeholm Corp., 118 F.R.D. 386, 391 (D.N.J. 1987);
Scarminach v. Goldwell GmbH, 531 N.Y.S.2d 188, 191 (Sup. Ct. 1988).
38. In contrast, the HEC signatory states believe "the burden of proof should be on the party
wishing to resist application of the Convention." Hague Conference on Private International Law:
Special Commission Report on the Operation of the Hague Service Convention and the Hague
Evidence Convention, 28 I.L.M. 1556, 1566 (1989) [hereinafter Special Commission Report].
39. Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 547.
40. Rich v. KIS California, Inc., 121 F.R.D. 254, 257 (M.D.N.C. 1988); Lyons v. Bell As-
bestos Mines, Ltd., 119 F.R.D. 384, 387-89 (D.S.C. 1988); Benton Graphics, 118 F.R.D. at 389;
Scarminach, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 190. But see Hudson v. Hermann Pfauter GmbH & Co., 117 F.R.D.
33, 38 (N.D.N.Y. 1987) (court places on the party opposing use of the HEC the burden of proving
that use of HEC procedures will frustrate the interests of West Germany and the United States and
the interests of all nations in a smoothly functioning international legal system). See also Born, supra
note 36, at 401-03.
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This burden on HEC movants has generally proved to be insurmountable. In
Benton Graphics v. Uddeholm Corp., the court required the HEC movant to
prove that the particular facts of the case and the sovereign interests involved
supported the use of the HEC and that HEC procedures would prove effective. 4 1
Similarly, in Rich v. KIS California, Inc., the HEC movant was required to prove
that the opposing party's discovery requests were overly intrusive, that an im-
portant sovereign interest of the foreign state was at stake, and that use of HEC
procedures could be effective.42 In both cases the moving party failed to sustain
the burden. 43 By contrast, in the one case in which a court placed the burden on
the party advocating use of the FRCP discovery methods and opposing use of the
HEC, the party could not sustain the burden and the HEC was used. 4 4
B. COMITY CONCERNs HAVE BEEN UNDEREMPHASIZED
Lower courts, in implementing the Agrospatiale test, have not given appro-
priate weight to concerns of international comity. The Supreme Court has de-
scribed comity as the cooperative spirit a domestic tribunal brings to the "res-
olution of cases touching the laws and interests of other sovereign states." 45 The
majority in Agrospatiale admonished lower courts to "take care to demonstrate
due respect for any special problem confronted by the foreign litigant on account
of its nationality or the location of its operations, and for any sovereign interest
expressed by a foreign state. ' 46 In practice, however, the lower courts, as
predicted by the minority,47 have given little weight to the laws and interests of
foreign states.
In one case, the HEC movant, a Swedish company, produced a declaration by
the Assistant Under-Secretary of the Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs stating
that use of the HEC was necessary to ensure protection of a variety of Swedish
41. Benton Graphics, 118 F.R.D. at 389.
42. Rich, 121 F.R.D. at 258.
43. Rich, 121 F.R.D. at 258; Benton Graphics, 118 F.R.D. at 391.
44. Hudson, 117 F.R.D. at 38. In the cases reviewed discussing the burden of proof, the party
assigned the burden failed in every case to sustain it. See, e.g., Rich, 121 F.R.D. at 258 (HEC
movants did not meet "their burden of showing that plaintiffs should be required to resort to
discovery via the [HEC]"); Lyons, 119 F.R.D. at 387; Haynes v. Kleinwefers, 119 F.R.D. 335, 337
(E.D.N.Y. 1988) (HEC movant "has failed to offer any cogent reasons to employ the Convention
procedures"); Benton Graphics, 118 F.R.D. at 390-91; Hudson, 117 F.R.D. at 38 (FRCP movants
"have not sustained" the burden of proving that use of the HEC would damage sovereign and litigant
interests); Scarminach, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 191 (HEC movant "clearly failed to meet its burden").
45. Adrospatiale, 482 U.S. at 543 n.27; see also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629 (1985) (the decision to allow arbitration of antitrust claims is
premised on concerns of international comity).
46. Airospatiale, 482 U.S. at 546.
47. See id. at 553-54. See generally Comment, The Supreme Court's Impact on Swiss Banking
Secrecy: Socidti Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District Court, 37 Am. U.L.
REv. 827 (1988).
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sovereign interests.48 The court downplayed these interests, labeling them
"merely general reasons why Sweden prefers civil law discovery procedures to
the more liberal discovery permitted under the federal rules." 49 The court found
the declaration insufficient because it did not explain why a particular discovery
request of the FRCP movant would violate a specific sovereign interest of Swe-
den. 5
Instead of giving proper recognition and weight to a declaration of interests
produced by a high-level government official of a foreign state, the district court
in Benton Graphics dismissed the declaration as little more than an essay on the
comparative law of Sweden and the United States. The court remarked that
"[d]efendants cite no reasons how the specific discovery sought by [the FRCP
movant] implicates any specific sovereign interest of Sweden." 5 1 Possibly no less
than a statement by a Swedish official that the FRCP movant's request for a
specific piece of paper implicated an important Swedish sovereign interest would
have sufficed. It stretches the bounds of practicality and reasonableness to require
high government officials in foreign states to respond with that level of speci-
ficity. 5
2
Other U.S. courts have been similarly unsympathetic to comity concerns. In
Roberts v. Heim, a Swiss defendant in a fraud case was compelled to testify in
the United States at his own expense. 53 The special master appointed to resolve
the issue reviewed Airospatiale and noted its reminder to lower courts to pay
careful heed to the concerns of foreign litigants and to foreign sovereign inter-
48. Benton Graphics, 118 F.R.D. at 391. The declaration claimed that discovery under the HEC
served such interests as enabling Swedish courts to limit discovery in protected areas (trade secrets
and national security), balancing the divergent rules of the United States and Sweden in determining
which party bears the costs of litigation, and discouraging the "fishing expeditions" so resented by
Sweden and other common law countries. id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. (emphasis in original). In requiring such specificity, the court perhaps was relying on the
Agrospatiale majority's statement that a "blocking statute thus is relevant to the court's particular-
ized comity analysis only to the extent that its terms and its enforcement identify the nature of the
sovereign interest in nondisclosure of specific kinds of material." Adrospatiale, 482 U.S. at 544
n.29. This is a strained reading of the majority's opinion. The majority's statement was made in the
context of analyzing the conflict between aggressive discovery and blocking statutes. The Swedish
sovereign interests enumerated by the HEC movant in Benton Graphics do not stem from a blocking
statute, but instead flow from the "coordinate interest" of Sweden as sovereign in the litigation. See
Airospatiale, 482 U.S. at 546.
52. See also Scarminach v. Goldwell GmbH, 531 N.Y.S.2d 188, 191 (Sup. Ct. 1988). An
affidavit by the HEC movant's attorney described West Germany as a civil law country where
evidence gathering was done by the judiciary and indicated that private evidence gathering without
resort to the HEC might violate West Germany's judicial sovereignty. Id. The state court rejected this
assertion on the ground that the affidavit of an attorney unfamiliar with West German law was not
sufficient "to advance the argument that a particular discovery device, employed against a manu-
facturer of consumer products, would violate the judicial sovereignty of [West Germany]." Id. The
state court apparently would have required costly expert testimony on West Germany's judicial
system before considering whether a discovery request violated West Germany's judicial sovereignty.
53. Roberts v. Heim, 130 F.R.D. 430 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
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ests.54 He also considered the brief filed by the Swiss Government as amicus
curiae in support of the French petitioners in Airospatiale, which highlighted the
impact of FRCP discovery on Swiss sovereignty.55 Nevertheless, the special
master did not appear to place any weight on "the sensitivity of the Swiss
government with respect to foreign discovery and its impact on Swiss sover-
eignty.' 56 Instead, the special master relied on his finding that no particular
Swiss law would be violated if the Swiss defendant was compelled to testify and
that in Aerospatiale the Supreme Court had "rejected the arguments of the Swiss
government as set forth in its amicus brief.
' 57
To their credit, some lower courts have given more careful consideration to the
laws and interests of foreign sovereigns. 58 The Seventh Circuit affirmed a district
court's decision not to compel post-judgment discovery of records of an insur-
ance company located in Romania and wholly owned by the Romanian Govern-
ment. 59 The defendant insurance company claimed that Romanian law regarding
"state secrets" and "service secrets" prohibited disclosure of this informa-
tion. 6° The court noted that the information requested was a "service secret"
under Romanian law and that the Romanian statute was directed at domestic
affairs instead of being merely a blocking statute. 61 To address the competing
interests, the court used two tests. First, the court used the test contained in
section 40 of the original Restatement.62 It weighed the "relative interests of
Romania in its national secrecy and the American interest in enforcing its judicial
decisions," and "determined that Romania's [interest], at least on the facts [in
54. Id. at 437.
55. Id. at 437-38.
56. Id. at 438. For an interesting contrast, see Minpeco, S.A. v. Conticommodity Services, Inc.,
116 F.R.D. 517, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (Bunker Hunt Silver case) (court finds Swiss interest in bank
secrecy to be substantial though it is personal and can be waived). See generally Comment, supra
note 47.
57. Roberts, 130 F.R.D. at 438. The Roberts court's reliance on the Supreme Court's "rejec-
tion" of Switzerland's amicus brief in Airospatiale seems misplaced. The Supreme Court did not
specifically address or even mention the Swiss amicus brief. Furthermore, even if the Supreme Court
had found that Switzerland's sovereign interests in Arospatiale were not compelling, such a holding
would not mean that, as a general rule, Switzerland's interests in its bank secrecy laws should be
discounted in every case. It is the heart of the majority's test that "in each case [scrutiny of] the
particular facts, sovereign interests, and likelihood that resort to [HEC] procedures will prove
effective" be performed. Agrospatiale, 482 U.S. at 544 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). The
special master had a duty to evaluate independently the sovereign interests of Switzerland that were
at stake in this case.
58. A state court ordered discovery from a nonparty to occur, according to the HEC. Relying on
Aerospatiale, the court cited concerns of international comity and respect for the judicial sovereignty
of West Germany as requiring use of the HEC. Orlich v. Helm Brothers, Inc., 560 N.Y.S.2d 10, 15
(App. Div. 1990).
59. Reinsurance Co. of Am. V. Administratia Asigurarilor de Stat, 902 F.2d 1275 (7th Cir.
1990).
60. Id. at 1279.
61. Id.
62. See supra note 8.
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the record], appears to be the more immediate and compelling." 63 Next, the
court analyzed the case under section 442 of the Restatement (Third). The court
found that section 442 and section 40 were equivalent except for the requirement
in section 442(2)(a) that the party against whom discovery is sought make a good
faith effort to secure from foreign authorities permission to comply with the
discovery request.64 The court held that no such "good faith" effort was re-
quired in this instance because the Romanian statute rendered such an effort
futile.65
Both the minority in Airospatiale66 and the lower courts67 have recognized the
difficulty of balancing competing U.S. and foreign interests. This difficulty is
evident in the uneven decision making among lower courts considering various
foreign sovereign interests and laws. Many U.S. courts resort to FRCP discovery
without full consideration of the interests underlying the HEC. This has had the
unfortunate effect of motivating foreign governments to enact and strengthen
blocking statutes to protect their nationals from what is perceived as the exces-
sive extraterritorial reach of U.S. law.
III. Proposed Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
A. PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
The Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Appel-
late Procedure and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure proposed various amend-
ments to the existing rules in September 1989.68 The Judicial Conference of the
United States approved the proposed amendments, in modified form, in Sep-
tember 1990 and sent them to the United States Supreme Court for review. 69 The
63. Reinsurance Co. of Am., 902 F.2d at 1280-81 (footnote omitted).
64. id. at 1282.
65. Id. at 1282-83. The concurring opinion by Judge Easterbrook in Reinsurance Co. of Am.
criticized § 442 on the ground that it enumerates many considerations without providing any real
guidance. He also expressed doubt that the balancing test in 442, which in this case made the
judgment against the Romanian company uncollectible, is sufficient authority to countermand Con-
gress's decision in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1988), to
authorize enforcement of such judgments. Reinsurance Co. of Am., 902 F.2d at 1283-84.
66. Arospatiale, 482 U.S. at 552 (American "courts are generally ill equipped to assume the
role of balancing the interests of foreign nations with that of our own").
67. See, e.g., Reinsurance Co. of Am., 902 F.2d at 1280; Minpeco, S.A. v. Conticommodity
Services, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 517, 522 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). ("[T]he obvious, albeit troublesome, re-
quirement for us is to balance the national interests of the United States and Germany.
(quoting United States v. First National City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 902 (2d. Cir. 1968)).
68. COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES, PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF APPEL-
LATE PROCEDURE AND THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (Sept. 1989) [hereinafter PROPOSED
RULES -PRELIMINARY DRAFT].
69. COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (Sept. 1990)
[hereinafter PROPOSED RULES]. The Supreme Court has until May 1, 1991, to transmit the proposed
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proposed amendments to rules 26 and 28 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
are of particular interest because they would, in effect, overrule Airospatiale.
1. Rule 26
The proposed amendments would add the following language to FRCP 26(a):
Discovery at a place within a country having a treaty with the United States applicable
to such discovery shall be conducted by methods authorized by the treaty unless the
court determines that those methods are inadequate or inequitable and authorizes other
discovery methods not prohibited by the treaty.
70
The intent of this amendment is to "reflect a policy of balanced accommodation
to international agreements bearing on methods of discovery." 7 1 According to
the Advisory Committee, concern for positive international relations requires use
of internationally approved discovery methods, provided such methods allow
litigants timely access to information. 72 Under the proposed new rule, courts
could not authorize discovery methods that violate a treaty to which the United
States is a signatory.73
The proposed amendment's broad language favoring the HEC is narrowed
considerably by the Advisory Committee Notes. 74 The proposed amendment
would not apply to depositions of parties (or persons they control) who may be
deposed in the United States. The Advisory Committee Notes also state:
The rule of comity stated in this rule does not apply to discovery of documents and
things from parties who are subject to the court's personal jurisdiction, and who may
be required to produce such materials at the place of trial. E.g., Insurance Corp. of
Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites, 456 U.S. 694 (1982). 75
This language apparently means that once personal jurisdiction over a party has
been established, the proposed amendment would no longer require first resort to
the HEC. First resort to the HEC would only be required in two cases-
discovery from foreign nonparties 76 and discovery of jurisdictional facts. 7 7
amendments to Congress. The proposed amendments, if not disapproved by Congress, could take
effect as early as December 1, 1991. See 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2072, 2074 (West Supp. 1990).
70. PROPOSED RuLEs, supra note 69, rule 26.
71. Id. rule 26, advisory committee notes subdivision (a) (citing Agrospatiale concurring opinion).
72. Id. rule 26 advisory committee notes subdivision (a).
73. Id. rule 26(a), rule 26 advisory committee notes subdivision (a).
74. The Advisory Committee Notes to the first version of the proposed amendment to rule 26(a)
required use of the HEC in a greater number of cases than the present draft requires. Those notes to
the first version discussed restrictions on use of the HEC due only to "inequitable" discovery.
PROPOSED RULES-PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 68, rule 26 advisory committee notes subdivision
(a). The Preliminary Draft apparently required HEC use even after personal jurisdiction had been
established. See id.
75. PROPOSED RULES, supra note 69, rule 26 advisory committee notes subdivision (a).
76. Present law already requires that discovery of foreign nonparties proceed under the HEC. See
Rich v. KIS California, Inc., 121 F.R.D. 254, 257 (M.D.N.C. 1988); Orlich v. Helm Brothers, Inc.,
560 N.Y.S.2d 10, 15 (App. Div. 1990).
77. There has been some controversy as to whether discovery under the FRCP can occur against
foreign parties contesting the personal jurisdiction of a federal court. Foreign litigants have argued
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The Advisory Committee Notes for proposed rule 26 discuss the tension be-
tween the desirability of following approved international methods of discovery
and the need to ensure that international litigants are not placed at an advantage
as compared to similarly situated domestic litigants:
The rule also directs the court to authorize the use of other discovery methods as may
be needed to assure that discovery is not "inequitable." International litigants should
not be placed in a favored position as compared to American litigants similarly situated,
especially in commercial matters with respect to which the similar American litigants
may be their economic competitors. Especially, an international litigant using the
provisions of Rule 26-37 should not be permitted to use the Hague Convention or a
similar international agreement or even the law of the party's own country to create
obstacles to equivalent discovery by an adversary.78
To ensure that discovery is equitable, a court may order discovery that violates
the laws of another country, 79 but may not authorize discovery methods that
violate a treaty that is the law of the United States. 80 The proposed rule also need
not be applied if internationally approved discovery methods are "inade-
quate." 81 A court may "make a discreet judgment on the facts as to the suffi-
ciency of the internationally agreed discovery methods." 82 The contours of this
exception are unclear.
Proposed rule 26 and the associated Advisory Committee Notes do not discuss
the issue of the allocation of burden of proof. Two alternative approaches are
possible. The party advocating HEC discovery could be required to prove that its
use will be "equitable" and "adequate." This approach finds support in present
case law.83 It would also better protect American litigants from unfair discovery
practices by foreign litigants-a concern clearly and forcefully made in the
Advisory Committee Notes. 84 Alternatively, the party advocating FRCP discov-
ery could be required to prove that use of the HEC would be inequitable or
inadequate. This approach is supported by the plain language of proposed rule
that, in such instances, they are more like nonparties. Rich, 121 F.R.D. at 258; In re Bedford
Computer Corp. (Bedford Computer Corp. v. Israel Aircraft Indus., Ltd.), 114 B.R. 2, 5 (Bankr.
D.N.H. 1990). Nonparties are generally subject to discovery solely through HEC procedures. Rich,
121 F.R.D. at 258; Orlich, 560 N.Y.S.2d at 15. Courts have been unsympathetic to this argument.
Rich, 121 F.R.D. at 260; Bedford, 114 B.R. at 6. The proposed amendment would reverse the rule
announced in these decisions.
78. PROPOSED RULES, supra note 69, rule 26 advisory committee notes subdivision (a).
79. Id., Interhandel, 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
80. Id. rule 26 advisory committee notes subdivision (a).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
84. See PROPOSED RULES, supra note 69, rule 26 advisory committee notes subdivision (a).
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26, which states that "[d]iscovery . . . shall be conducted by methods autho-
rized by the treaty unless the court determines that those methods are inade-
quate or inequitable . . . ." 85 The mandatory language "shall" establishes a
strong presumption favoring use of the HEC in relevant circumstances, which
is rebuttable only if a court is convinced that use of the HEC will be
inadequate or inequitable. 86  Also, the policy considerations underlying pro-
posed rule 26 favor this approach.81 Overall, the plain language and policy of
proposed rule 26 imply that the burden is on the party opposing use of the
HEC to prove use of the HEC will be inequitable or inadequate.
2. Rule 28
The proposed amendments to rule 28(b) subject the taking of depositions in
foreign countries to the balancing provisions of revised rule 26(a). 88 The party
taking the deposition must follow applicable treaty or convention procedures if
an effective deposition can be taken by such means. 89 This remains true even if
under such procedures a verbatim transcript is not available or testimony cannot
be taken under oath. 9° The proposed amendments also allow the taking of dep-
ositions in a foreign country in accordance with applicable international agree-
ments or by a letter of request.
9 1
85. Id. rule 26(a) (emphasis added).
86. See id.
87. See id. rule 26 advisory committee notes subdivision (a) (proposed rule 26(a) added to
"reflect a policy of balanced accommodation to international agreements bearing on methods of
discovery").
88. The proposed amendments would revise the current Rule 28(b) as follows (new language is
underscored):
Rule 28. Persons Before Whom Depositions May Be Taken.
(b) In Foreign Countries. Subject to the provisions of rule 26(a). depositions may be taken in a foreign country (1)
pursuant to any applicable treaty or convention, or (2) pursuant to a letter of request (whether or not captioned a
letter rogatory), or (3) on notice before a person authorized to administer oaths in the place in which the examination
is held, either by the law thereof or by the law of the United States, or (4) before a person commissioned by the court,
and a person so commissioned shall have the power by virtue of his commission to administer any necessary oath and
take testimony. A commission or a letter of request shall be issued on application and notice and on terms that are just
and appropriate. It is not requisite to the issuance of a commission or a letter of request that the taking of the deposition
in any other manner is impracticable or inconvenient, and both a commission and a letter of request may be issued
in proper cases. A notice or commission may designate the person before whom the deposition is to be taken either
by name or by descriptive title. A letter of request may be addressed "To the appropriate Authority in [here name the
countryl." When a letter of request or any other device is used pursuant to any applicable treaty or convention it shall
be captioned in the form prescribed by that treaty or convention. Evidence obtained in response to a letter of request
need not be excluded merely for the reason that it is not a verbatim transcript or that the testimony was not taken under
oath or for any similar departure from the requirements for depositions taken within the United States under these
riles. PnoPosED RuLEs, supra note 69, role 28(b).
89. Id. advisory committee note.
90. Id.
91. Id. rule 28(b). The term "letter of request" is substituted for "letter rogatory" throughout
rule 28(b). The letter of request is the primary method provided by the Hague Convention for seeking
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B. BENEFITS OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
The proposed amendments have two immediate benefits. First, by making
first resort to the HEC mandatory92 under some circumstances, the uncer-
tainty engendered by the Aerospatiale majority's test and the section 442 test
is avoided to some extent. In relevant cases lower courts would be required
to turn first to the HEC unless its use could be deemed "inadequate or
inequitable." 93 Courts would not have to determine which party carried the
burden of proof or make difficult determinations of whether U.S. or foreign
interests should prevail. The more structured framework of the proposed
amendments is likely to lead to more consistent decision making among the
lower courts.
The second major benefit of the proposed amendments would be increased
attention and deference to international comity concerns and the interests and
laws of foreign sovereigns. Since the proposed amendments require, in some
cases, first use of the HEC for foreign discovery, lower courts will have to
familiarize themselves more thoroughly with the HEC and the international
comity concerns that support it. Judicial expertise will be gained, and with it, an
enhanced appreciation of the interests and laws of foreign states.
In addition, use of HEC discovery methods is more palatable to foreign
signatory states than is use of the FRCE Many foreign states have explicitly
consented to the HEC's procedures and therefore have consented to whatever
infringements of their sovereignty such procedures might entail. 94 However, few
foreign states have consented to U.S. discovery methods. Use of the HEC will
no doubt reduce diplomatic tensions 95 between the United States and foreign
states. In addition, it would eliminate the impetus for the enactment by foreign
governments of additional "blocking" statutes. 96 In turn "the mutual interests
of all nations in a smoothly functioning international legal regime"' 97 will be
advanced.
foreign judicial assistance in the taking of depositions. Id. advisory committee note. There are no
changes between the proposed amendment to rule 28 approved by the Judicial Conference and that
originally proposed in the September 1989 Preliminary Draft. Compare PROPOSED RULES, supra note
69, rule 28 with PROPOSED RULES -PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 68, rule 28.
92. "Discovery ... shall be conducted by methods authorized by the treaty .... PROPOSED
RULES, supra note 69, rule 26(a) (emphasis added).
93. Id. rule 26(a).
94. See Adrospatiale, 482 U.S. at 556.
95. See, e.g., id. at 558 n. 14.
96. Some blocking statutes, such as that of France, provide an exception for discovery done in
accordance with treaties such as the HEC. Airospatiale, 482 U.S. at 565. This further reinforces the
argument that HEC signatory states are willing to comply with the procedures of a treaty to which
they have consented.
97. Id. at 555.
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If the proposed amendments are accepted, U.S. courts will have to reconsider
their position on article 23 declarations98 made by HEC signatory states.99 Many
foreign states have made blanket article 23 declarations, forbidding pretrial dis-
covery of documents, in acceding to the HEC. too Many of these same states have
ameliorated the effect of these blanket declarations by the enactment of laws or
regulations allowing pretrial discovery of documents in certain instances.
10 1
Thus, some states' blanket declarations have been converted into partial article
23 declarations.
The Advisory Committee Notes, in discussing the adequacy of foreign dis-
covery methods, provide that a "party should be required to make first resort
under the Hague Convention despite a partial article 23 reservation by the coun-
try in which discovery is sought, but not if that country has imposed a blanket
reservation as an obstacle to discovery." 10 2 The Advisory Committee Notes
apparently require U.S. judges to conduct a detailed statutory and treaty analysis
of a foreign state's law to determine if a blanket reservation has been sufficiently
ameliorated so as to constitute a partial article 23 declaration. Such determina-
tions are likely to be time-consuming and difficult.
C. CRITICISMS OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
Strong criticisms have been leveled at the proposed amendments. Some com-
mentators have argued that the proposed amendments are inequitable to Amer-
ican litigants, who are subject to full FRCP discovery when litigating against
foreign parties, while their foreign adversaries are subject to the more "limited"
HEC procedures. 103 Other commentators argue that the district courts presently
98. Article 23 of the HEC provides:
A Contracting State may at the time of signature, ratification or accession, declare that it will not execute Letters of
Request issued for the purpose of obtaining pretrial discovery of documents as known in Common Law countries.
HEC, supra note 13. at 101. Except for the United States. Israel, and Czechoslovakia, all signatory states have made
such a declaration limiting pretrial discovery. Bom, supra note 36, at 397.
99. Courts have ordered discovery in foreign states that have made article 23 reservations. See,
e.g., Adrospatiale, 482 U.S. at 536-37; Scarminach v. Goldwell GmbH, 531 N.Y.S.2d 188, 191
(Sup. Ct. 1988).
100. See, e.g., Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters,
accessions reprinted at 28 U.S.C.A. § 1781, at 104-16; see supra note 98.
101. See, e.g., Adrospatiale, 482 U.S. at 564 n.22 (France modified its blanket article 23
declaration; Germany promulgated new regulations permitting some pretrial discovery); Special
Commission Report, supra note 38, at 1566 (U.S. courts should be "most impressed by alterations
made in the laws of civil law countries to accommodate American procedural methods .. ") The
Special Commission also "encouraged any States which have made or contemplate making the
reservation under article 23 to limit the scope of such reservation" in order to make the HEC more
useful to litigants from common law states. Id. at 1564.
102. PROPOSED RULES, supra note 69, rule 26 advisory committee notes subdivision (a).
103. Comments of Professor Carrington, reporter of hearing, at the Hearing on the Proposed
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
at San Francisco, Cal. (Jan. 9, 1990) at 84; Letter from Mr. Eisenstat (President N.J. State Bar Ass'n)
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are applying the majority's test fairly, and the proposed amendments are unnec-
essary. 104 A few commentators contend that it is inappropriate for a Supreme
Court decision to be overturned through the rulemaking process. 105 Some have
stated their belief that the HEC is ineffective or overly time-consuming. 106 Two
of the concerns raised by the commentators, the supposed inefficiency and in-
equity of the proposed amendments, merit special attention. 
107
1. HEC Discovery Methods May Not Be Substantially
Less Efficient than FRCP Discovery Methods
Many courts' 0 8 and commentators' 0 9 have complained that use of the HEC
slows down discovery, making U.S. litigation less efficient and more expen-
sive. 110 When the bases for many of these assertions are examined closely, they
seem to rest more on conjecture than on reality. For example, in Aerospatiale the
majority viewed the letter of request procedure under the HEC as "unduly time
consuming and expensive."' 11 However, the minority correctly pointed out that
"[t]he Court offers no support for this statement and until the Convention is used
extensively enough for courts to develop experience with it, such statements can
be nothing other than speculation." 112
Lower courts frequently have made similar assumptions about the HEC's
expense or inefficiency, which are supported by little more than speculation. In
one case a court relied in part on a 1959 study highlighting "[t]he myriad
practical problems and expenses involved in taking evidence abroad" 113 to sup-
port a finding that the cost of HEC procedures for foreign discovery in a 1980
to James E. Macklin (Committee Reporter) (Mar. 15, 1990) at 16; Letter from Mr. Gerson (Asst.
Att'y General-Civil Division) to Judge Weis (Mar. 15, 1990) at 3 [hereinafter Gerson letter].
104. Comments of Mr. Riesenberg, Division of Enforcement at Securities Exchange Commis-
sion of Hearing on the Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure at Chicago, Ill. (Feb. 2, 1990) at 75 [hereinafter Riesenberg
comments].
105. Id. at 75; Letter from Professor Burbank to James E. Macklin (Mar. 14, 1990) at 4-5.
106. Riesenberg comments, supra note 104, at 75-76; Gerson letter, supra note 103, at 3.
107. These were also the two main considerations analyzed by Justice Blackmun in his separate
opinion. Adrospatiale, 482 U.S. at 561, 565.
108. Id. at 542-44; Rich v. KIS California, Inc., 121 F.R.D. 254, 258 (M.D.N.C. 1988);
Haynes v. Kleinwefers, 119 F.R.D. 335, 338 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); Benton Graphics v. Uddeholm
Corp., 118 F.R.D. 386, 391 (D.N.J. 1987); In re Bedford Computer Corp., 114 B.R. 2, 5-6 (Bankr.
D.N.H. 1990) (citing Rich); Scarminach v. Goldwell GmbH, N.Y.S.2d 188, 191 (Sup. Ct. 1988).
109. See supra note 106.
110. This is an interesting complaint, given that FRCP discovery methods often are not partic-
ularly efficient or cost-effective. See Airospatiale, 482 U.S. at 562.
111. Id. at 542.
112. Id. at 561 (footnote omitted).
113. Pain v. United Technologies Corp., 637 F.2d 775, 790 n.75 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 1128 (1981).
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lawsuit "would be exceedingly high." 14 Because the HEC did not exist in 1959,
the study can only support the general proposition that foreign discovery without
the HEC was relatively more expensive in 1959.
More recently, in Haynes v. Kleinwefers, the court found, with no original
analysis, that the use of HEC procedures in Germany "can be a very time-
consuming and expensive effort."" 5 The court then noted that new German
regulations allow pretrial production of specific, relevant documents in response
to letters of request." 6 However, the court did not take the next logical steps of
analyzing the new regulations or requiring further evidence from the parties
concerning the efficacy of the new regulations. Instead, the court assumed that
the new regulations would not provide for adequate discovery." 17 The court cited
no authority to support this assumption and provided no analysis of this alleged
inadequacy of the German regulations. It appears the court never seriously
considered the possibility that these new regulations could make the HEC an
effective alternative to FRCP discovery." 
8
In light of the limited acceptance by lower courts of HEC procedures, it
remains unclear whether discovery under the HEC is substantially less efficient
than FRCP discovery. Even in those instances where resort to the HEC might
prove somewhat more costly or time-consuming, the inconvenience to the indi-
vidual litigant may be more than outweighed by the substantial U.S. interest in
respecting the sovereignty of foreign states and in supporting international co-
mity.
2. FRCP 26(c) Would Protect Domestic Litigants
from Potential Discovery Inequities
The concern that a rule of first resort to the HEC would prove unfair to
domestic parties litigating against foreign parties is a very real one. This is
particularly true in instances where the HEC may be manipulated to provide a
114. 637 F.2d at 790. Another court later cited Pain as support for the statement that HEC
procedures are "cumbersome and costly, and often fail to adequately secure full foreign discovery."
Jennings v. Boeing Co., 660 F. Supp. 796, 806 (E.D. Pa. 1987), aff'd, 838 F.2d 1206 (3d Cir.
1988). See also Murphy v. Reifenhauser KG Maschinenfabrik, 101 F.R.D. 360, 361 (D. Vt. 1984).
115. Haynes v. Kleinwefers, 119 F.R.D. 335, 338 (E.D.N.Y. 1988) (citing Murphy, 101 F.R.D.
at 361). It is important to note how the speculation of courts about HEC procedures has spread and
become transmuted into authority. Haynes cites Murphy, which partially relies upon Pain, and Pain
relies on the outdated 1959 study for the proposition that use of the HEC is expensive and time-
consuming. A state court came to an identical and equally unsupported conclusion about the new
West German regulation. Scarminach v. Goldwell GmbH, 531 N.Y.S.2d 188, 191 (Sup. Ct. 1988).
But see Hudson v. Hermann Fauter GmbH & Co., 117 F.R.D. 33, 39 (N.D.N.Y. 1987) (court cites
the new West German regulations to support its conclusion that use of the HEC can yield adequate
results).
116. Haynes, 119 F.R.D. at 338 (citing Airospatiale, 482 U.S. at 564 n.22).
117. Id. at 338.
118. See also Scarminach, 531 N.Y.S.2d at 191.
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litigation or economic advantage to a foreign litigant to the detriment of a
domestic litigant subject to FRCP discovery." 9 The majority in Arospatiale
cites this concern as one rationale for rejecting first use of the HEC. 120 However,
the text of the proposed amendment to rule 26(a) and the Advisory Committee
Notes show considerable sensitivity to fairness concerns. 12 Vigilance and ef-
fective use by the courts of their power under FRCP 26(c) 122 to limit discovery
may be an acceptable accommodation of the competing interests. 1
23
In at least one case a district court recognized the utility of rule 26(c) in
limiting inequitable discovery. 124 The court recognized the United States' inter-
est in assuring fair and equal treatment to all litigants in its courts. 125 This
interest could be upset if one party to a lawsuit used FRCP discovery, and another
party to the same suit used HEC discovery. 126 The court ordered discovery to
proceed under the HEC. 127 However the court, drawing on its powers under rule
26(c), warned that "if justice requires, [the court] can compel discovery from
[the West German defendant] pursuant to the Federal Rules if the use of the
Convention's provisions leaves [American] plaintiffs at an unfair disadvan-
tage." 28 This case demonstrates that, even absent the specific authority set out
in the proposed amendment to rule 26(a), district courts have the capability to
reconcile use of the HEC with concerns of fairness to American litigants.' 
29
D. REMAINING QUESTIONS
The proposed amendments leave several issues unresolved. First, proposed
rule 26(a) is silent as to what method of discovery is preferred once personal
jurisdiction has been established. Courts still may be required to engage in the
Airospatiale majority's balancing test; alternatively they may be able to order
FRCP discovery immediately, under the rationale that the rule enumerates the
119. See PROPOSED RULES, supra note 69, rule 26(a) advisory committee notes subdivision (a).
120. Adrospatiale, 482 U.S. at 540 n.25.
121. PROPOSED RULES, supra note 69, rule 26(a); PROPOSED RULES, supra note 69, rule 26(a)
advisory committee notes.
122. FRCP 26(c) reads in relevant part: "[A] court . . . may make any order which justice
requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden
or expense." FED. R. Ctv. P. 26(c).
123. See Airospatiale, 482 U.S. at 565-66.
124. Hudson v. Hermann Pfauter GmbH & Co., 117 F.R.D. 33, 39 (N.D.N.Y. 1987).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 40.
128. Id. at 39.
129. If the proposed rules are adopted, district court judges may have to devote more time than
is now the case to supervising discovery in transnational litigations in order to ensure fairness. This
will impose a burden on scarce judicial resources. However, it can be argued that the added expen-
diture of supervisory time is fully justified by the important sovereign and litigant interests that are
at stake. Moreover, the additional time required may be insubstantial given that district courts are
already required, in transnational litigation, to "supervise pretrial proceedings particularly closely to
prevent discovery abuses." Adrospatiale, 482 U.S. at 546.
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only instances that HEC discovery methods are to be used. Second, the proposed
rule leaves parties in doubt at the inception of a litigation as to which discovery
method will be used. It makes discovery dependent on the defenses asserted by
the defendant. Third, the proposed rule may require a mini-hearing on personal
jurisdiction before a court may order FRCP discovery. This would interpose
another layer of delay into the already lengthy litigation process.
IV. Conclusion
The majority opinion in Airospatiale creates an undesirable and unworkable
framework in which lower courts must make determinations about the appropri-
ate use of the HEC. Lower courts, inexperienced in transnational litigation and
unfamiliar with the HEC, have given little weight to concerns of international
comity or to the legitimate interests of foreign states in their laws and sover-
eignty, and they have applied the majority's ad hoc test unevenly. Some courts
have placed a nearly insurmountable burden of proof on a party moving for use
of the HEC, while other courts have perfunctorily dismissed legitimate sovereign
interests advanced by foreign litigants and governments.
The proposed amendments to FRCP 26 and 28 are a fair compromise between
conflicting U.S. interests, foreign interests, and international comity concerns in
the discovery process. By providing a rule of first resort to the HEC for the
purposes of establishing jurisdiction and deposing nonparties, the proposed
amendments better structure and define the analysis district courts must utilize in
transnational litigation. The foreign evidence provisions of the Restatement
(Third) adequately track current law. However, the law appears to be shifting in
a direction not anticipated by the Restatement's authors.
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